SouthEast Asia: IndoChina

(Source: Paul, E. [2010]. Obstacles to democratization in Southeast Asia: A study of the nation state, regional and global order. London: Palgrave Macmillan.)

THAILAND

Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized by Anglo-European powers. This was due partly to the King of Siam's negotiating skills and compliance with the commercial and political demands of colonial powers, as well as to the British and French strategic alliance to maintain the country as a buffer zone between their competing imperial ambitions. To maintain its independence, Siam had to cede Siem Reap, Battambang and Sisophon provinces to the French in 1907 and transfer the Malay states of Kedah, Pedis, Kelantan and Trengganu to the British in 1909. The judicious policy of the royal household kept the country from Japanese rule during WWII. Japan was given freedom of passage for its troops to Burma and elsewhere in the region and in exchange for friendly collaboration, Thailand was rewarded with the transfer of some territory which it claimed from British Burma and Malaya and French Cambodia. After WWII the communist insurgency prompted Thailand to support the growth of a powerful military establishment and the emplacement of a military dictatorship with the help of US money and aid. In exchange the United States built a number of military bases in Thailand as part of its war against communism in Indochina. In recent years, there has been some notable progress in the democratization of the country and, perhaps because it was never colonized it is possible to detect a positive trend towards the protection of human and political rights. Nevertheless, the military, as in Turkey and Pakistan constitute a continuing challenge to the political stability of Thailand.

Pathway to democracy. Democratization in Thailand as elsewhere in Southeast Asia is a form of war waged by citizens' demands for power and political equality. It has been fought on many fronts by communist uprisings on behalf of poor peasants of the north and northeast as well as by minority groups in the south. A major terrain of political engagement is the primate city of Bangkok where some major battles have been fought in recent years, such as the 1973 great student rebellion which overthrew the military dictatorship of field marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and the 1976 bloodbath when the military seized power. One of the most important confrontations was the 1992 Black May popular uprising which overthrew another military regime and introduced major political reforms and the 1997 Constitution which strengthened civil society and press freedom.

The struggle for democracy has been a slow and difficult process marked by violence and repression, and regression to military rule. Nevertheless, the movement for a more open, fair and just society has gained strength over the years. Thailand's forces for social justice and democracy consist of many NGOs, including

labour unions, students', farmers' and rural organizations, environmental and professional groups, as well as some political formations. Together they have fought for and advanced democracy in Thailand over the years. Thailand's movement for democracy has been fighting an alliance between the military and the monarchy to maintain political control over the country. During King Bhumibol Adulyadej's reign to 2006 there were 11 suc­cessful putsches. The 1957 and 1977 coups were against royal power; all the others have been about 'ensuring the solidarity and strength of the royal-military alliance in the face of potential challenges, be they pro-democracy students, communist insurgency, or a headstrong elected prime minister (Handley 2006b). Towards the end of the 1980s the region was becoming more peaceful and Thailand was emerging as one of East Asia's tiger economies.

Economic and political development, however, was hampered by the frailty of Thailand's emerging parliamentary system which was controlled by special interests, while the Senate was appointed directly by the prime minister. There was no bill of rights to protect civil liberties or a court system to minimize corruption. The weakness of democratic institutions was one of the main reasons for the inability of the system to resolve peacefully major conflicts which confronted the country and which, time after time, led to political instability and the intervention of the military. Thus the introduction of a new constitution in late 1997 marked an important change in the governance of Thailand. The new constitution made the government more accountable and brought firm rules to tackle money politics. Special courts and a judiciary were put in place to oversee elections and the operation of parliament. Lastly, a new and directly elected 200-member senate was introduced (Vatikiotis 1997). The constitution of 1997 gave Thailand a new and promising political charter to undertake fundamental reforms and advance the democratic process. Reforms such as mandatory voting and the election of both houses led to the first directly elected Senate in the political history of Thailand. Previously, members had been appointed for their connections and money contributions, as a political reward for services to those in power, like retired generals, but also to put family members of the elite into safe and Influential seats. In the new senate, senators were supposed to have no political affiliation to protect them from political influence and to give them more independence to support anti-corruption reforms and government transparency measures.

A number of institutions were put in place to implement the new political charter and stop corrupt practices, and promote cleaner politics. Among these were the Election Commission (EC), the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC), a new Ombudsman, the Official Information Act and the Human Rights Commission. Politicians had to declare all their assets. The head of the NCCC Apichit Jinakul said that 'Once they take office they must be prepared to bare all, their total net worth' (Cheesman 2000). In the new 200-seats Senate election of 2000 the EC failed to endorse the victory of 78 candidates and disqualified them for falsifying their declared wealth and vote-buying and other malpractices and ordered new polls. Anti-corruption measures made some inroads in the culture of political corruption and some ministers were indicted during the Chuan Leekpai government. In 2000 the NCCC indicted the deputy prime minister and home minister Sanan Kachornprasart, a major general known as 'Mr Teflon', for lying to minimize his real assets. Another casualty of the anti-corruption process was the indictment of the minister for transport Suthep Thaugsuban for collusive tendering (Aiford 2000): This was the first time that politicians were brought in front of the court system to answer corruption charges against them.

Under the new jurisdiction, Thailand prosecutors issued warrants for the arrest of a number of crooked bankers and financiers who defrauded the country of fortunes as part of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The crisis uncovered major financial scandals. Some had to do with the siphoning of funds for private use during the free-for-all business culture promoted by Thailand's neoliberal economic policy under pressure from the United States. When the crunch came many businesses went bankrupt. In some instances, particularly in the case of banks, they received funds from the central bank via the IMF to refloat the banking and financial sector. The cost of the bailout was in the order of US$115 billion. Some of that money was siphoned off by corrupt business identities and officials. A headline case was that of Pin Chakkaphak, the Thai takeover of the king's company Finance One, once Thailand's largest finance company. He fled the country in 1997, leaving behind huge debts, and was finally arrested living in a US$5 million apartment in London's Belgravia district. His expensive legal team in the UK is making a bid to save him from extradition to Thailand. Another key figure in the 1997 Asian financial crisis is India-born Rakesh Saxena who was involved in the US$4 billion 1996 collapse of the Bangkok Bank of Commerce. He has been living in Vancouver, protected by the Canadian government (Cheesman 1999). He is accused of siphoning off about £300 million, starting in 1991, in shading derivative and other speculative trades.

The failure of democracy. An aspiring and ambitious politician in the wake of the political reforms following the 1997 Asian financial crisis was former policeman Thaksin Shinawatra, who by 2000, was Thailand's richest tycoon, with a telecommunication empire valued at more than US$2 billion. As the leader of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party (Thais love Thais Party), Thaksin financed his rise in politics to become prime minister in 2001. He was accused of bribing a number of MPs from the opposition party, the ruling Democrats, to join his party which was a major factor in his 2001 electoral win. Buying votes is an ingrained part of the system and in the 2001 legislative elections some US$460 million was used to buy votes (Ti, 2004). The TRT party received majority support from the country's 65 per cent rural poor, particularly in the north and northeast of the country, with promises of major improvement in their living standards. Thaksin was popular enough to stay on as prime minister until the coup of 2006.

He swept to victory in 2004, based on his popularity with poorer and rural sections of the Thai electorate, because of his policy of free or low-cost health care for needy Thais, and cheap loans to farmers and small business in rural areas. He increased his support in the 2005 elections, winning 80 per cent of seats. His success highlighted growing inequality between Bangkok's 5 million or more people and the rest of the country - what Walden Bello calls 'the subordination of most of Thailand to Bangkok since most industry, about 90 per cent, was concentrated in the city' (Bello, Cunningham & Ron 1998:246). Thaksin was able to mine to advantage the country's rising inequality, a situation highlighted in a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report which stated that 'throughout the 1990s the share of income going to the poorest 20 per cent of the population stayed below 5 per cent' (undp 2000).

Problems began to emerge for Thaksin's government with the issue of corruption regarding his own accumulation of wealth. Early on in his career as prime minister, he proceeded to pass legislation and make decisions that would benefit his business and family holdings.

The biggest beneficiary of putting a limit on foreign investment in the local telecommunication sector from 49 per cent to 25 per cent was his family telecommunication company, the Shin Corporation. Another boost in the income of his family empire was the decision to cancel the Shin Corporation's obligation to pay royalty to the government (Baker, 2002). Thailand signed an FTA with Australia in 2003 which contained some significant benefits for Thaksin's telecommunication company in its access to the Australian telecommunication market. This came soon after the Singapore government's SingTel purchased Australia's second largest telecommunication company, Optus. It has been suggested that the Thai-Australia FTA (TAFTA) was largely driven by the Australian dairy industry's plan to access the Thai market in exchange for a deal with Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra telecommunication company to invest in Australia's communication sector. This would involve the construction of satellite and relay stations in Australia to service Singapore's satellite launched from French Guyana (Paul, 2006). In January 2007, Thaksin sold Thai mobile phone, media and satellite group Shin corporation to Singapore government's investment company Temasek Holdings for US$3.8 billion, realizing a profit of US$1.9billion without paying a cent in tax because the assets were in the Caribbean US Virgin Islands'

tax-haven (Boucaud & Boucaud 2006a).

Thaksin's attack on governance and transparency unfolded in the early years with restrictions on the powers of anti-corruption bodies. He limited freedom of the press while at the same time advising listeners to his radio programme that 'if you find anyone who is unusually rich, please inform the Government'. When he was accused of concealing his assets, and putting them in the name of his servants and placing relatives and friends in important positions, he began to attack the press and to use his television station to threaten media editors who were critical of him (Baker, 2002). With a majority in both houses the ruling party was able to block attempts to censure him and have him impeached. Driven by a large ego and rising popularity, Thaksin became more dismissive of parliamentary opposition. He was moving towards some form of despotism, driven by his belief that he could make Thailand prosperous. The model was Singapore's efficiency and success under Lee Kuan Yew's one-party state (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). Thaksin saw the monarchy as an obstacle to embedding Thai society in a market economy and developing Thailand as a major capitalist regional core. He had ideas of transforming Thailand into some sort of corporate state that his party would run as a business on behalf of Thai shareholders.

Thakin's bleaker legacy was his government's abuse of human rights, beginning in early 2003 when he declared war on drug dealers and gave the green light for extrajudicial killings. Between January and April 2003, state agencies and contractors assassinated more than 2500 alleged drug dealers and received payments and bonuses based on results. Moreover, in reaction to the deteriorating situation in the southern provinces, the government carried out arrests and targeted killings and kidnappings of known activists, such as high-profile human rights lawyer Somchai Neelapaichit who represented alleged Jemaah Islamiah members and disappeared in March 2004. Furthermore, the government dissolved organizations put in place to negotiate peaceful terms and move towards some form of permanent reconciliation with Thailand's Malay Muslims minority.

In 2005, Thaksin ordered the deportation of thousands of Burmese illegal workers and victims of the 2004 Tsunami back to Burma and declared a state of emergency to 'solve' the insurgency in southern Thailand. Christine Chanet, UN Human Rights Committee Chairwoman in Geneva, censored Thailand and asked the government to explain 'its record of detention of suspects without charge, the disappearance of activists; abuse of refugees, ethnic minorities and migrant workers; media censorship; and the state of emergency imposed on the Muslim south' (Levett, 2005). Chanet said that the government's emergency powers by 'granting impunity to officers who might have committed abuses and by allowing suspects to be arrested for up to 30 days without charges' violated Thailand's international treaty protecting basic civil and political rights (Hoge, 2005).

Return of the military. Thaksin was disliked by the King, despite his generosity towards the royal family, and could not avoid a confrontation with the military when he began to replace senior military leaders with his own supporters. He relieved a number of generals from their command, including the supreme commander general Surayud Chulanont who was to become the new prime minister in the aftermath of the 2006 coup. The military establishment was also critical over his soft approach to the Myanmar crisis and his business dealings with the military junta. Thailand's military wanted a hard line military response to Myanmar's large export of drugs to Thailand (Boucaud & Boucaud 2006b).

With rising discontent and defection within his party, Thaksin resigned in April 2006 and called for a snap election which was boycotted by the opposition Democratic Party. He won the election but the results were contested in the country's constitutional court which, on the king's instruction, annulled the results. On the night of September 2006, while thaksin was in New York attending a UN summit, the tanks once again rolled into the streets of Bangkok. At the same time the coup leader Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin addressed the nation and declared that the military had to intervene to restore peace and harmony and that the way it (Thaksin government) exercised power was corrupt, immoral and widely self-benefitting (ABC, 2007b).

This was a bloodless military coup by a junta calling itself the Council for National Security led by Thailand's first Muslim head of the army who went on to appoint retired general Surayud Chulanont as Prime Minister. This was the same Surayud who was Bangkok's military commander and ordered his troops in 1992 to fire on people, killing many demonstrators (Buruma, 2007:44). September 2006 marked the 17th coup during the reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's 60-year reign and the first in the past 15 years. Paul Handley, who worked as a foreign correspondent in Asia for more than 20 years, claims that this latest putsch was about the succession to the throne and that the King and the military did not want the King's son Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn to succeed, in essence the coup was about the maintenance of the monarchy-military alliance ruling the country, and the controlling role of the King's Privy Council to make a final decision about the successor to ailing King Bhumibol (Handley, 2006a). Thaksin lost the confidence of both the King and the military when he began to put his people in key military positions, which led to a confrontation with General Sonthi, the coup leader.

Obstacles to democratization. The four million Muslim Malays in a Buddhist country of more than 65 million have a proud history and culture of independence. Their demand for sovereignty is long standing and marked by an insurgency that killed more than 2000 people between 2004 and 2006. The southern provinces have been among the poorest in the country and received little development aid from the central government which has treated its people over time as second-class citizens because of their ethnicity and religion. A Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) report blames the insurgency on 'historical grievances stemming from discrimination against the ethnic Malay Muslim population and attempts at forced assimilation by successive ethnic Thai Buddhist governments in Bangkok for almost a century (ICG, 2005). The confrontation has increased in intensity in recent times as a result of Thaksin's final solution approach to the issue as part of a campaign with the United States to wage 'war on terror'. The insurgency must be seen in the wider context of what many Muslims believe is an attack on Islam on the part of the West.

A major obstacle to a more open and democratic society is the role of the military in society. The Thai military built its power and legitimacy in politics during the cold war as a major ally of the United States in its war against communism in Southeast Asia. During the cold war the United States built three air bases at Udorn, Ubon and U-Tapao to bomb Indochina during the Vietnam War, and 560 km of paved roads and a naval base at Sattahip, while the Thai sent 11,000 ground troops, or 14 per cent of its army, to fight in Vietnam (Hiebert, 1995) Their close collaboration was rewarded over the years with substantial funding from the United States for training and weaponry and formed the basis for the expansion of the Thai military business activities and share of the country's income. The military owns many businesses, including television channels and radio stations, and has extensive holdings in Thailand's infrastructure and real estate. The expansion of its corporate role in the country's economy has always been a key aspect of its political strategy and alliance with the monarchy.

This role has grown as it has become a close ally in the US coalition of the willing, following 9/11. The United States categorizes Thailand as a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally which puts Thailand on par with Egypt and Israel. Most of the Influential generals are US-trained and come out of the ranks of Special Forces which receive priority funding from the United States. The United States has been using Thailand air bases in the war against Iraq and the occupation of Afghanistan. Thailand is part of the NATO-fine defence system which links Japan and Australia with key members of ASEAN as part of a coalition to contain China and deal with other regional problems, and is used as a forwarding base to position US military hardware and weaponry to which the United States has direct access. This implies that the United States may come in and out of Thailand as it pleases and continue to maintain bases on Thai soil.

The 'war on terror" provides a new platform for the military to retain firm control over demands for a more open society, and to maintain its symbiotic relationship with the monarchy. This can be seen as a return to the intimate relations that existed during the Vietnam War with the close cooperation between Thailand and US counter-terrorism agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Thailand set up the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Centre (CTIC) in 2001, at the time of Thaksin's appointment as prime minister, which incorporates Thailand security agencies, the National Intelligence Agency, the Special! Branch of the Thai Police and the elite Armed Forces Security Centre. US counter-intelligence people work and train together with the CTIC and conduct operations in Thailand and elsewhere to arrest or kidnap suspects. Facilities in Thailand and Singapore have been used for the detention, interrogation and movement of Muslim prisoners and other detainees. During the military interim, new laws were passed to give the military more power; the Internal Security Act gives the Internal Security Operation Command power to arrest and interrogate without a warrant .and censor the mass media.

The monarchy's dilemma. King Bhumibol Adulyadej is not a supporter of democracy. Institutions based on divine and birth right are essentially anti-democratic, and based on power relations meant to subjugate and exploit, and tend to corrupt the political process. The monarchy, whose wealth is valued at some US$41 billion, is an unreformed legacy of a feudal system steeped in myth and magic, and, thanks to a culture of fear, can hide his own corruption, greed and in-fighting. The Thai monarchy needs the full protection of the law to shield itself from public scrutiny, including censorship of all media material and web sites critical of the royal family, and there are severe penalties for criticizing the royal family. Paul Handley's book The King Never Smiles which demystifies and undermines images built over the years by media and other forms of propaganda is banned in the country as 'a threat to the stability' of the kingdom (Handley, 2006a).

Thailand's political culture is constructed on discipline and submission to the monarchy and the worship of a 'just and virtuous' paternal figure as leader and protector of the people. A dangerous outcome is fear of punishment and dependency on the King to solve all major problems. Fear and dependency form the cornerstone of the monarchy military alliance, and the King depends on the military to maintain his power over Thais. Handley writes that 'the palace has long used its own proxy generals to maintain sway on the military, and that has been the key role of the Privy Council head, General Prem Tinsulanonda, since he was King Bhumibol's hand-picked prime minister in 1980. His first duty on the Privy Council is to keep the military locked in steps with the palace' (Handley, 2006b).

Ian Buruma writes that 'one of the dangers of this dependency is the one that plagues all systems based on personal charisma: what if the successor lacks the necessary qualities to command respect?' (Buruma, 2007:45). It could be argued that the present king has been an instrument of stability during his long reign and made a substantial contribution to the welfare of Thais in his charities and role model in conservation work. But the present monarch, born in 1927, is now a recluse in poor health and likely to die soon, and his successor, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, has a reputation as 'spoiled, prone to violent rages, vindictive, ... [and] is little respected by the Thais' (Ibid.,45). Handley too says that this 57-year-old presumed heir to the throne is widely disliked and feared and, with Bhumibol's coming death, his heirs 'must evolve and remake the throne themselves before they are forced to do so by the media and a generation of better-educated Thais' (Handley, 2006b).

A return to civilian rule took place with the election of December 2007 which led to the formation of a government led by the People Power Party (PPP), a proxy for the Thaksin Shinawatra banned Thai Rak Thai party. During the military interim, new laws were passed to give the military more powers: the Internal Security Act gives the Internal Security Operation Command more power to arrest and interrogate without a warrant and to censor the mass media. Whatever party is in government will need to respond to the directives of the military until there are fundamental changes in the constitution which strips the military of its business world and returns it permanently to its barracks.

CAMBODIA

Struggle for liberation. Cambodia in the twelfth century was a very large and important kingdom in Southeast Asia, known as Chenla. Over time its size and power shrank because of the growing power and territorial expansion of the Thai and Vietnamese people. When the French intervened in the region in the nineteenth century, they first gained control of Vietnam and then extended their control to Cambodia, beginning in the 1860s, and used its royal and feudal structure to advantage to colonize and exploit the country. Discontent emerged by the time of World War I among the peasantry and the Khmer elite, but the Kingdom was relatively peaceful until the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the year Cambodia gained its independence. There was to be no peaceful transition, however, because of Cambodia's Communist challenge to control the country. Cambodia's Communist party, known as the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer), became an important and infamous political force in the country as Cambodia became a pawn in the cold war and a major target in Southeast Asia's US military intervention. Sadly, the war in Cambodia did not end until 1999 when remnants of the Khmer Rouge were integrated into the country's mainstream politics. Since then, the democratization process has been enfeebled by widespread corruption and the strengthening of a one-party state.

The Khmer Rouge's regime lasted from 1975 until 1979 when Vietnam invaded the country to put an end to Pol Pot's genocidal policy. During Vietnam's occupation, fighting continued between Vietnam and a number of resistance groups, including remnants of the Khmer Rouge occupying a number of enclaves along the Thai border. Between 1979 and 1989 the United States, China and their allies joined ranks and refused to legitimize the newly created Popular Republic of Kampuchea (RPK) and continued to recognize the Khmer Rouge's United Nations ambassador Thiounn Prasith as the legitimate representative of Cambodia. For 14 years this power alliance with the help of Thailand's military supported the Khmer Rouge's military activity and killing. Singapore also played a major role between 1979 and 1993 supplying the Khmer Rouge while all major leaders of Cambodia's genocide were protected by the international community (Jennar, 2006).

Several million Cambodians were killed during the 1965-99 Cambodian conflict. The intensity of the killing reached a height because of Khmer Rouge's genocidal policies and US B-52 carpet bombing of the coun­tryside. University of Hawaii academic Rudolph Rummel writes that Cambodia probably lost slightly less than 4 million people to war, rebellion, man-made famine, genocide, politicide and mass murder. The vast majority, almost 3.3 million men, women and children (including 35,000 foreigners) were murdered between 1970 and 1980 by successive governments and guerrilla groups (Rummei, 1997). Victims of Khmer Rouge's mass killing are estimated at between 1.5 million and 2.4 million people (Sharp, 2007). The war traumatized an entire people, and destroyed the country's professional classes and government institutions including the judiciary where only four out of 545 judges survived the years of terror.

Cambodia's ecology was dramatically damaged as a result of intense fighting and the US dropping millions of tons of explosives on the country more than the United States dropped on Japan during WWII (Oennar, 1995). According to recent research by Harvard University researchers Owen Taylor and Ben Kieman, "from October 4, 1965 to August 15,1973, the United States dropped 2,756,941 tons of explosives" or more than the allies dropped 'during all of WWII, including the bombs that struck Hiroshima and Nagasaki ... Cambodia may well be the most heavily bombed country in history (Taylor & Kieman, 2006). A cruel legacy is the millions of mines and unexploded munitions which kill hundreds of civilians each year. With one amputee per 236 populations, Cambodia boasted the 1995 record for the most amputees per capita of any country in the world.

Many attempts have been made to explain the rise and actions of the Khmer Rouge. One discourse is to understand Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime as a millenarian movement. The Khmer Rouge came out of a period of devastation and traumatization with a leadership espousing communist slogans. Yet it rejected modernity by evacuating cities and reverting back to a collective agrarian existence. The Khmer Rouge demonized the West and was intensely chauvinistic, cruel and sure of its destiny. It combined nationalism with a vision of taking society back to an imagined Khmer golden age. Norman Conn's historical study of mil­lenarian movements reminds us that these flourished at times of mass and acute crises of disorientation and particularly 'among the poor and oppressed whose traditional way of life has broken down' (Cohn, 1970:52).

Walther Marschall, former German diplomat in Phnom Penh, argues that the responsibility for Cambodia's human disaster lies in a small group 'of feudal upper class Cambodians and corrupt officials and businessmen interested only in amassing personal fortunes' (quoted in Tee, 1976), and traces the origin of the Cambodian tragedy 'to Prince Sihanouk's autocratic, feudal and extremely personal regime' (Marschall, 1975). What is known is that the situation worsened with the US-led coup which put General Lon Nol, another corrupt leader, in power. Many have argued that the rise of the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot's genocidal policy was largely triggered by the US bombing campaign which killed many peasants and destroyed their rural communities. William Shawcross makes the case that US bombing was responsible for the atrocious behaviour of the Khmer Rouge, and journalist Tiziano Terzani claims that US B-52 carpet bombing gave birth to the Khmer Rouge and their fanatical savagery (Shawcross, 1979; Terzani, 1985).

Towards a one-party state. The end of the cold war led to Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia. Negotiations were concluded in October 1991 when 18 countries and four Cambodian factions signed the Paris agreements and gave Australia control of the UN-mandated military intervention in Cambodia, with the task of setting up a transitional authority in the country, disarming the various armies and preparing the country to elect a new government. The mission of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was to lay the foundation for peace and democracy in the country. Australian general John Sanderson and the more than 16,000 international troops under his command stayed in Cambodia until 1993, spending more than US$3 billion. Despite some positive achievements the UN mission has been described as 'amazingly wasteful and incompetent and marred by internal conflict', and its leadership as 'incapable of taking crucial decisions' (Murdoch, 1993). Among the many problems were UNTAC's failure to disarm and demobilize the four main factions and its allowing the Khmer Rouge to keep control of a number of enclaves along the border with Thailand. As a result the fighting went on long after the departure of the UN and prolonged the suffering of the population. The UN also turned a blind eye to Thailand's support of the Khmer Rouge.

UNTAC did not complete its mission of 'rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia. Little was done to repair and rebuild basic health, education and communication infrastructure. Not enough effort was made to train a new generation of administrators and technocrats to run a country that had been devastated by war over several decades. This was particularly the case in regard to establishing the rule of law and rebuilding the judiciary and other key institutions of governance. Moreover, UNTAC did not put in place a human rights investigative arm with wide powers to monitor the human rights situation and investigate human rights abuse. This was largely because Australia's then foreign minister blocked the appointment of a special rapporteur to the UN, fearing that such a move would antagonize members of ASEAN and highlight human rights abuses in their own countries (Murdoch, 1993).

UNTAC organized and supervised Cambodia's 1993 national election without the collaboration of the Khmer Rouge. UNTAC imposed a system of proportional representation which did not suit the country's conditions, and the elections of 1993 led to a dangerous standoff of antagonistic political forces because no party could gain an absolute majority to rule the country. The election resulted in the formation of an uneasy coalition government of Hun Sen's party, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), with its former enemy, the royalist United National Front and the Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia party known by its French acronym as FUNCINPEC. Hegemonic contest for the control of Cambodia's politics has been driven by Hun Sen's CPP. Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge commander, became a member of a core group in the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) under the Vietnamese-installed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and foreign minister in 1979; then as prime minister, he undertook negotiation which led to the Paris agreement of 1991 and the UN intervention (Gottesman, 2003). For the 1993 election, Hun Sen renamed the KPRP the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), and managed to keep control of the armed forces, police and judiciary.

The departure of UNTAC left the CPP and FUNCINPEC at each other's throats in a fierce contest to expand their power base and unify the country and to claim the perks and privileges of government employment and concessions. After 1993, prime minister Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh were involved in negotiations with major elements of the Khmer Rouge at their enclaves of Anlong Veng and Pailin to integrate them into mainstream politics and 'were falling over each other to win the manpower and territorial spoils of defecting Khmer Rouge units' (Baker, 1997). This exercise resulted in bloating the ranks of senior officers and civil servants with 2000 generals and 10,000 colonels, and an army of many ghost units appeared on the payroll. Following an escalation of violence between both parties, Hun Sen launched a coup in July 1997 and took over complete power, killing many political opposition figures. The new political configuration was legitimized in the 1998 fraudulent general election validated by the international community. In later years the CPP consolidated its power and negotiated an arrangement to share the spoils of office with FUNCINPEC. Over the years, Hun Sen has consolidated his power-base in the country and within the party. The CPP has an extensive apparatus to control officials at various levels of territorial administration, down to the village level which links alliance to the party with substantial rewards such as land and other resources.

The CPP claims a largely rural-based party membership of some 4 million. In the 2007 election Hun Sen's CCP won control of 1592 communes out of 1621 communes. While election observers claim that there were fewer complaints than in past elections, the ruling party manipulated the election to advantage by controlling major TV and radio media and suspending mobile-phone text messaging during the election. Some 50% of the electorate did not vote for fear of their safety or because their names were not on the electoral roll or they found it impossible to access their polling stations. At 55 years of age Prime Minister Hun Sen is young, and ambitious enough to stay in power for another 20 years while grooming his eldest son as a potential successor. He displays the characteristics of a modern authoritarian leader: chauvinistic and with a powerful ego demanding to be treated like royalty in his domestic travels and meetings with the Buddhist Sangha, and clever in manipulating market forces to advantage for himself and his cronies.

A repressive state. Hun Sen's power is based on the control of the state's raw power and main agencies of repression. During the UN transition period, Hun Sen and his party retained control of the military, police and judiciary, and built up their forces and armaments after the 1993 election by diverting substantial state resources away from social needs. The party power structure is hierarchical, with a core around Hun Sen and family and a small elite in control of the state apparatus. Family networks are a key feature in Cambodian corruption because trusted members can be slotted into positions important to the leadership. Beyond the family, a larger circle incorporates important cronies with members of parliament and ministers, and police and military leaders to run the system of wealth abstraction and distribution needed to maintain and expand the client base which keeps the pyramid in place. The patronage system encourages competition among clients to favour their patrons. Manipulation promotes conflict among clients and weakens their ability to unite and conspire against their patrons.

An extensive patronage system depends on the control of and access to a range of resources to reward clients according to their position in the hierarchy. Public resources include foreign aid and investment flows; gov­ernment employment and procurement contracts; various types of permits, concessions and monopolies; and access to natural resources such as minerals, forests and land. The CPP's patronage system benefits from a strategy of co-optation of key opposition members. Hun Sen's party's position is reinforced by the collaboration or a token opposition made up of royalists happy to become rich while playing the role of opposition. As long as they play the game and restrict their ambition and numbers, the CPP openly supports their activities. Parties like FUNCINPEC help legitimize the CPP's power monopoly, particularly in the eyes of the G7 major donors. In contrast, Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) activities, mostly funded by expatriate Khmers, are firmly controlled by the state.

What defines Cambodia's authoritarianism is corruption. A key feature is a symbiotic relationship with the business sector as source of funds and support. Hun Sen and his entourage have close links with powerful business syndicates. The focus following the 1993 elections were on the CPP links to Sino-Khmer business identity Theng Bunma, Cambodia's then wealthiest businessman and drug lord who was paying for limousines and private planes for top politicians, and for interest free loans to the state budget (Thayer, 1995). While Bunma has disappeared and may be dead, the regime now has links with a new and rising small elite of savvy younger entrepreneurs such as Kith Meng who has become very rich and a leading facilitator of foreign business invest­ment in Cambodia. As a close ally to Hun Sen, Meng's Royal Group has 'secured a trove of lucrative government concessions, licenses and land deals' (Crispin, 2007). Like Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Meng has gained a leading edge in benefits ensuing from government privatization of state assets, and the inclusion of foreign investors in the expansion of the country's market economy. His business interests presently include a major stake in CTN television, Camlot lottery and mobile telecom leader Mobitel, and a 45 per cent share in Australia ANZ's business venture.

The ruling party and associates are involved in rackets such as the illegal export of expensive logs by elite military units controlled by Hun Sen (Bereiowitch & Reverchon, 2004). There are links with drug and gambling groups operating Cambodia's casinos and the large number of banks in the capital city involved in domestic and international money laundering. Laundered money in turn provides capital for land acquisition and speculation, and illegal logging and smuggling operations. One of the biggest rackets is the logging of what remains of Cambodian forests. Virgin forest cover has declined from more than 70 per cent in 1970 to 3.1 per cent in 2006. Deforestation in recent years has been driven by logging concessions to family members of the governing elite and cronies, and the large number of 70-year lease economic land concessions (ELCs) made between 1992 and 2006 to 96 private companies (Agrawai, 2007). Global Witness, a London-based anti-corruption group, suggests that 'family members and business associates of the prime minister and other senior officials are illegally destroying Cambodia's forests with complete impunity' (Global witness, 2007). This syndicate is 'behind a major illegal logging racket in Southeast Asia's largest lowland evergreen forest, Prey Long, and its members are implicated 'in tax evasion, kidnapping, bribery and attempted murder and protected Martin Stuart-Fox suggests that Vietnam's civil society is more vibrant than Cambodia's, and writes that 'freedom of speech and the media still exists, though the Cambodian-language press has begun to fall into line. What keeps civil society alive, is the presence of international and some particularly brave Cambodian NGOs, which continue to criticize the government. So long as they remain active, Cambodia will not revert entirely to an authoritarian state - at least not while it is in the regime's interests to retain a democratic facade' (Stuart-Fox, 2006). The regime's viability depends on large inflows of foreign aid and investment and is likely to maintain the status quo at this stage and to keep open and manage some limited political space for the activities of the many NGOs operating in the country.

Prospects. Progress in the process of democratization is uncertain. In a largely agrarian country the resolution of the peasant problem and the transformation of a rural traditional society into a new social formation is likely to have a strong bearing on changes in the political regime. Agriculture is being transformed with the activities of large agribusiness investments in plantations displacing rural workers and promoting migration to urban areas. The process of urbanization could shape the nature of politics in the coming years if the ranks of the middle class were to increase substantially and opportunities for mass education and employment became available. Naly Pilorge, director of Cambodia's human rights organization Licadho, warns that Cambodia has entered a new period of barbarism, 'extreme violence, greed and disregard for the most basic human rights - of giving people a place to live - are still with us daily. The methods of the past are being used to dictate our future' (Levy & Scott-Clark, 2008).

Political change is closely linked with changes in living standards. The capacity of Cambodia to meet social and economic needs for a growing population depends on many factors which are closely related to employing some 200,000 people entering the labour market each year. A growing economy is largely dependent on attracting foreign investments in competition with neighbours with low labour cost, such as Vietnam and Thailand, and more broadly, competing successfully in the enlargement of ASEAN's free trade area. In this environment, government policy is more likely to maintain a repressive regime to guarantee political stability and economic incentives to attract foreign investors. The development of the oil industry-based on recent major oil finds off the coast of Sihanoukville, which could soon pump some US$4.6 billion into Cambodia's economy annually for the next 20 years or so - would further serve to secure the stability of the one-party state.

LAOS

In the nineteenth century Laos was an array of small and petty states over which Thailand claimed suzerainty. The French had occupied Vietnam and Cambodia and seized Laos between 1885 and 1899. Historian Milton Osborne writes that 'more clearly than anywhere else in mainland Southeast Asia this was the case of the European advance bringing into existence a new state, one that despite great political transformation has survived to the present day' (Osborne, 1990:72). Organized resistance against the French emerged during WWI and it was not until much later that the country's independence movement, headed by one of the royal princes, became linked with the Vietnamese Communist Party. During Vietnam's war against the French, the northeastern part of Laos was an important base for Vietnamese forces and gradually Laos became a major DattleTield In subsequent confrontation against the United States, until the fall of Saigon in 1975.

The Pathet Lao (Lao Nation), the country revolutionary and nationalistic movement, gained control of the country In 1975 and proceeded to abolish the monarchy and construct a one-party state headed by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) which has remained in power ever since. The political situation in Laos today is the direct result of European colonialism and US military intervention after WWII to maintain Vietnam's partition and contain China's revolution. Laos's struggle tor independence after WWII and during the cold war killed more than 350,000 people and caused widespread damage to the country's ecology. During the second Indochina war, Laos was effectively fractured into four spheres of influence: 'Chinese in the north, the Vietnamese along the Ho Chi Minh trail in the east, the Thais in western areas controlled by the US-backed Royal Government, and the Khmer Rouge operating from sanctuaries in the south' (Lintner, 1995:19).

Laos has been called one of the most heavily bombed places on earth. More than 1.8 billion kilos of ordnance was dropped by the United States between 1964 and 1973 in 'a secret war against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese' (Coates, 2005:31). Between 1965 and 1973 the United States dropped 'more bombs on Laos than on Japan and Germany during World War II' (Bacher, 1988:9). Large amounts of ordnance were dumped over northern Laos by US planes on their way back from Vietnam and Cambodia to their bases in Thailand. Laos continues to be littered with buried and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and many thousands have been killed or maimed since the end of the Vietnam War by exploding ordnance (McDonald 1995; vitchek 2006).

One-party state. Power is controlled by the LPRP. Power is hierarchical and centralized within the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, consisting of a few and mostly high-ranking military men. The population was close to 6 million in 2008 and party membership was relatively small; in 1999 it was estimated at 78,000 members or 1. 7 per cent of the population (Stuart-Fox ,1999). Civil society is organized and integrated into the one-party state. The state controls the media and owns all print and broadcast media. The party's mass organization is the Lao Front for National Reconstruction which incorporates large groupings such as the Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union, the Lao Women's Union and the Lao Federation of Trade Unions.

The military arm of the party, is the Lao People's Army (LPA), has built up its forces in recent times with the help of China's training and arms. The LPA is moving towards self-financing and runs commercial con­glomerates which operate on a regional basis and incorporate a range of commercial activities ranging from timber logging and processing, to tourism, construction, agribusiness and transportation. The LPA also operates its own trading company which dominates the development and operations of border towns. Corruption is widespread and part of the cost of doing business with the government. A patronage system forms the structure of the party itself and its relations with society and the business community. Getting on in life is based on personal networks to access services and employment, to pay taxes and fees and to settle disputes. Corruption in that sense is part of the economic cost of doing business in a low-income society with a weak and underpaid administration, and where positions of power are largely self-financed. One outcome has been the LPRP's and LPA's liberal use of state banks for loans; this has been a major factor in the country's yearly trading deficit with the rest of the world.

In recent years there has been a major shift in the party's economic-policy from a socialist command to a market economy, following the example of both China and Vietnam. The government has put in place the necessary civil and commercial legal framework and administrative reforms to attract and secure foreign investment and aid. Foreign companies can set up 100 per cent-owned subsidiaries. Policy change was largely brought about by the loss of financial backing from Moscow and Hanoi and the changing geopolitical environment favouring a shift towards a market economy and integration in the prevailing neoliberal global economic order. The transition to a market economy took place as early as 1986 with the government freeing the market price for rice and other basic food commodities.

Along with economic reforms, the ruling party's ideology is moving away from its Marxist-Leninist foundations towards an authoritarian form of nationalism using Buddhism to legitimize party rule. The government appears to have packaged Buddhism into a national ideology to gain support of the population by manipulating some of the key values regarding reverence for life and death and the spirit of ancestors, and acceptance of life's conditions based on reincarnation. Such an approach can forge a spirit of unity and continuity of the Lao people and a reverence for past leaders and their achievements. Identity formation can be further shaped by government encouraging young people to spend time in a monastery and help the community, and turning Buddhist shrines into altars to worship a newly constructed nationalism. This form of socialization promotes unity and discipline and serves as a substitute for a more formal political education. However, it presents a serious obstacle to integrating a large number of Christian minority groups into the national mainstream. As part of their nationalist campaign, the government is targeting a number of Christian minorities and has banned Christian missionaries from proselytizing in Laos.

Laos's economic reforms have attracted substantial foreign investments, mainly in resource extraction. One of the more successful is Australia's Oxiana Mining which is Laos's largest business, employing some 2000 personnel, it began operating in 2002, mining gold, silver and copper. Many mining companies from China, South Africa and Canada have been exploring the country for mineral and energy development potential as well as for gold, coal, gemstone and iron ore. Thailand is Laos's largest investor and Japan the largest donor. China is a growing source of economic activity with investment in areas such as logging, cement and agribusiness, and the Chinese are becoming a dominant feature in the retail industries and other commerce in northern Laos, as part of a major southern migration movement from Yunnan province.

In recent years Laos has leased large land areas to foreign agribusiness. The country, with less than 6 million people on a territory half the size of France, has leased between 2m and 3m hectares, or about 15 per cent of its viable farmland, to foreign investors keen to secure food and industrial supplies (Schuetaer, 2008). Chinese rice and rubber land projects dominate in the north with Yunnan Natural Rubber Industrial Co planning to develop more than 300,000 hectares of rubber plantation by 2015. There are Japanese, Indian and Scandinavian farms in the centre of the country, while in the south Thai, Vietnamese and Malaysian companies dominate the southern lowlands where rubber, sugar and cassava plantations carve out vast swaths' (MacKinnon 2008), In the process, many farmers have been displaced from their land, with little or no compensation. According to environmental groups, 'land conflicts are rising as plantations encroach on village fields and nearby forest taking away traditional livelihoods with little or no compensation' (Schuettier 2008).

A major focus of Laos's economic growth is based on the development of the country's substantial water resources. Laos has a network of lakes and rivers linked to the Mekong which flows through the length of the country and forms the major part of the western border with Thailand. A major study by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) shows that the country's hydropower potential is as high as 18,000 megawatts (Lintner, 1994a:70). Some hydroelectric stations are already functioning and linked to Thailand's energy grid, such as the ISO-megawatt Nam Ngum dam north of Vientiane and the 45-megawatt plant at Xeset in the southern province of Saravane. These are owned and operated by the Lao government with most of the power sold to Thailand. New hydroelectric stations, however, are being built and planned on a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) basis. This is the case with Nam Theu Hinboun hydro dam located on a major tributary of the Mekong River. It was completed in 1998 and is operated by an international consortium which sells most hydropower to Thailand. A bigger and equally controversial project is the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) project. This is the world's largest private sector hydropower project, generating some 1070MW (Mwe) of electricity, by damming another major tributary of the Mekong, the Nam Theum river, and creating a 450 km² lake linked to a powerhouse to release the water into yet another Mekong tributary, the Xe Bang Fai.

The NT2 is financed by a debt of some US$1 billion provided by a number of multilateral and bilateral agencies and export credit agencies, and a consortium of 14 international private banks (eib,  2005; MIGA, 2006). The BOOT project is controlled by the Nam Theum 2 Power Company Limited (NTPC) which has the right to develop, own and operate the hydropower plant and other facilities. The WB and other multinational institutions will provide the guarantee for the project which covers risk insurance against expropriation, breach of contract, war, civil disturbance and 'transfer restriction and inconvertibility' and lenders rights 'under the numerous project agreements with the government of Laos and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT)' (miga,  2006). The WB provides the insurance to protect the international banks from potential loss caused by 'the nonperformance of contractual obligations undertaken by the government' of Laos (Imhof, 1997). The NTPC will operate and own the project for 25 years and deliver most of its electricity to Thailand for the same period starting in 2009 under an agreement with EGAT. The project is said to cost US$1.25 billion and is expected to 'generate US$1.9 billion in foreign exchange earning over a 25-year period' (miga,  2006).

NT2 is a controversial development and has attracted a severe criticism based on the project's costly social, economic and environmental impact. One issue is the BOOT system which essentially puts the project in the hands of foreign private developers and banks with the WB providing the financial guarantees for the entire project and transferring the risk from the private developers to the government of Laos and hence to the people of Laos. The financial return to the people of Laos appears to be inordinately low. Given the size of the project and its impact on the country's economy, the agreement transfers a major share of Laos's sovereignty to the international financial sector which ultimately rests on Western military power to enforce the terms of transfer of the country's natural resources.

Some years ago, Sweden's SIOA warned that such a project poses 'an imminent danger that the country loses control over the exploitation of one of its major natural resources' and instead recommended a 'rent-a-river^’ approach to 'safeguard national control over hydro-power resources and to avoid fragmentation of the electricity sector' (Lintner, 1994b:70). Other serious objections have been raised by domestic and international NGOs. Opponents of the project claim that 'it will hood an ecologically sensitive environment, dislocate thousands of tribes people, and won't even generate the promised revenues' (Lintner, 1997:48). An International Rivers Network study highlights the plight of more than 6000 indigenous people facing forced resettlement and the destruction of their livelihood (irn,  2007).

Because of its geography, Laos can eventually play a vital role in the economic integration of mainland Southeast Asia. Already economic growth shows the potential role of the country as a major node and way station in Southeast Asia's transport network with important links established with Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma and Thailand and southern China. Recent communication infrastructure include Laos's communication satellite and mobile network largely owned by Thailand's Asian Broadcasting and Communications Network (ABCN), a number of bridges and roads crossing the Mekong and extensive damming and blasting work to open the Mekong for navigation from southern Yunnan to Luang Prabang (Osborne, 2004). An important project was the 1993 Australian - built Mitraphad bridge near the capital Vientiane, linking Laos with Thailand, making it possible to drive from Singapore to Beijing through Laos. Rail links with Thailand have been restored and plans are on track for the long-awaited pan-Asian rail line, linking Singapore to Kunming. Better connection with China has increased levels of trade and of people moving between southern China's landlocked Southern Yunnan province and Laos.

Prospects for democratization. The LPDR is likely to remain a one-party state for the foreseeable future under its control and monopoly. A major contributing factor is the poverty of Laos's 5.8 million people. The country's per capita GOP in 2006 was less than US$500 and is among the world's least developed countries (UNCTD,  2007a:311). Laos is largely an agrarian country with some 80 per cent of the population employed in agriculture and most in subsistence agriculture. About 40 per cent of the country is mountainous and the home of the country's many isolated ethnic minorities. Challenge to the regime is relatively weak. There is some home-grown resistance such as the Lao Students Movement for Democracy, whose leaders were jailed in 2001 following a demonstration in Vientiane. The main challenge comes from expatriate organizations. One is led by members of the former Royal Lao elite, led by Prince Soulivong Savang, grandson of the last King of Laos, who escaped Laos at the age of 18. He lives in Paris, and in 2007, at the age of 54, it was said that he had plans with his allies to return and claim the throne, with the help of Thailand's royal family.

Other overseas-based groups have been active in fomenting and funding insurgency. This community is split between Lao and Hmong, who represented about 5 percent of the total population in the 1960s. Hmong are led by an aging Van Pao who led a clandestine army trained and armed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Vietnam War. Van Pao was the leader of the Hmong CIA - funded mercenary who fought communist forces in the Vietnam War. The group was also involved in a programme of assassination in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia under the leadership of US officers who later became involved in the Iran-Contra affair. US academic Alfred McCoy and others have linked Van Pao to drug trafficking during the war, operating heroin processing plants in Laos and shifting the drug with the help of a CIA airline, Air America (McCoy, 1972). Overseas Hmong are funding and recruiting members among the large Lao population in the United States, France and Australia. Van Pao was arrested in the United States in 2005 for running a terrorist organization, and was accused of funding large purchase of arms to use in insurgent operations to overthrow the Laotian government (Spiller, 2007) More recently the United States has accepted a plan for a number of Hmong groups stranded in northern Laos to settle in the United States.

Political change in Laos is likely to be dictated by relations with members of ASEAN. Laos joined ASEAN in 1997 and is expected to meet a number of Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA) requirements to bring tariff on most goods down to 5 per cent in 2008 and open up the economy to imports from its partners. Moreover, issues over China's expanding economic influence within the ASEAN market and more directly via the southern Yunnan province needs to be resolved in the context of Laos's economic and social needs and growing population. Laos is a strategically located, landlocked country in a dynamic part of the world, and its future will continue to be largely dictated by the political economy of its powerful neighbours. China, Vietnam and Thailand will have a major influence on Laos's political development. In a geopolitical climate where regional integration is putting great pressure on the government, the ruling party is expected to retain firm control over economic planning. This is likely to continue as long as China and Vietnam stay on their present political course. Conversely, if China and Vietnam were to move towards a more open society, Laos would necessarily follow along the same course.

VIETNAM

The French ruled Vietnam from 1854 until they were defeated by General Vo Nguyen Giap at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The battle for Vietnam's liberation began after WWI and escalated at the end of WWII with the beginning of the resistance in the south in 1945 and a major uprising in the north in December 1946. During the battle of Dien Bien Phu the United States offered France two tactical nuclear weapons to save it from defeat, one to use against China and another to rescue French troops at Dien Bien Phu (Schwartz & Derber, 1992:86). Soon after France's withdrawal from Vietnam, the war for independence became embroiled in the cold war, with the United States engineering the country's partition and backing the south in a war against the north. By 1965 the United States had mounted a full invasion of the south with more than 500,000 US troops, supported by large military contingents from the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea, and the war spread to battlefields and mass bombings in Laos and Cambodia.

The United States lost the war when Saigon fell to the Viet Cong in 1975, but hostilities continued with Vietnam's military intervention against Cambodia's Pol Pot in 1978 to save the population from the Khmer Rouge's regime of terror, followed by China's Deng Xiaoping sending troops across the Vietnamese border in 1979 and destroying four provincial capitals to 'teach the Vietnamese a lesson', Vietnam's presence in Cambodia was opposed by China, the United States and Thailand which armed and continued to support the Khmer Rouge (Chomsky, 1993; Pilger, 1998; Shawcross, 1996). Vietnam left Cambodia in 1989, but it was not until 1990 that Vietnam and China stopped exchanging shellfire across their contested border. Mass killing and maiming and the destruction of the environment have been major setbacks in the country's development. More than 500,000 were killed during the war against the French (1945-54). Casualties during the second Vietnam War (1960-75) have been estimated at between 2 and 3.8 million killed (Nguyen, 1984; Obermeyer, et al., 2000). Between 1965 and 1971 in an area 'slightly bigger than Texas, the US military forces exploded 13 million tons of munitions in Indochina¹ or the equivalent in energy 'of 450 Hiroshima nuclear bombs'. The amount of munitions dropped from the air was 'approximately twice the total used by the US in all theatres of World War II (Westing & Pfeiffer, 1972:3). Between 1961 and 1971 the United States conducted chemical warfare against the Vietnamese by spraying 77 million litres of Agent Orange, a defoliant containing some 400 kilos of dioxin, over some 2.6 million hectares of the country (Gendreau, 2006).

The US war in Vietnam resulted in 'the destruction of 2.2 million hectares of forest and farmland' (Osbome, 1990:218). Aerial spraying covered some 10 per cent of the country area and 50 per cent of its forest and mangroves areas, and between 2.1 million and 4.8 million people were directly affected (Gendreau, 2006; Stellman, et al., 2003). A montagnard in Quang Ngai province saddened by the devastation of his land asked the writer Sophie Quinn-Judge, 'why Americans hate the colour green' (Quinn-Judge, 1985). The war and chemical warfare continues to affect the health and productive capacity of the country. Many families suffer because of genetic pathologies with large numbers of children born with disabilities because of genetic damage and contamination of food supplies. Entire regions are excluded from production because of chemical poisoning and the presence of explosives. The chief architect of this destruction was Robert McNamara, former defence secretary under presidents Kennedy and Johnson. McNamara was rewarded for his effort with the presidency of the World Bank. In 1995 he confessed that the war had been a big mistake and that the United States was 'terribly wrong' in getting involved and should have withdrawn from South Vietnam in 1963

(McNamara, 1995).

Globalization. Vietnam joined the neoliberal global economy because it did not have a choice. There was no US 'Marshall Plan' unlike in Germany and Japan after WWII, or some form of compensation from the United States. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the opportunities for help from ties and treaties of friendships with socialist countries ended in the late 1980s. The war had destroyed much of the country's infrastructure and environment and the population was impoverished and growing at more than 2 per cent per year. Not surprisingly the Vietnamese Communist Party's sixth congress in 1986 began the process of economic liberalization and its Dot Moi policy (renewal/renovation). Progress was relatively quick after the initial decision to liberalize the economy. The collectivization of agriculture, which had led to the import of rice ended in 1989 and by 1995 the government had closed, merged or privatized close to half its state-owned firms. Economic liberalization was accompanied by the normalization of Vietnam's relations with the Western world and the integration of the country into the capitalist global economy. The ending of the US embargo in 1994 led to Vietnam's inclusion in ASEAN in 1995, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998.

A bilateral trade deal was signed with the United States in 2001 as a prerequisite to membership in the WTO in 2006. Vietnam's big push for fast growth based on foreign investment and export has been relatively successful. In recent years the country has attracted large investment flows from Asia and the West to the many industrial and free economic zones. Major foreign investors came from the British Virgin and Cayman Islands and other Caribbean tax havens. Economic growth has been cyclical in tune with the world's economy, and with levels of real GDP growth in excess of 7 per cent from 2002 to 2006, and over 8 per cent in 2006. US bilateral trade deals in 2001 and admission to the WTO in 2006 have increased levels of foreign investment in information technology, such as the 2006 Intel plant in Ho Chi Minn City Technology Park, and expanded the service sector for hi-tech services to global industries, such as architectural designs and drawings. According to the head of the State Securities Commission, Vietnam's equity market 'would grow to at least 40 per cent of the economy as state banks and companies sell shares' (Bloomberg, 2007).

There has been substantial progress in the reduction of poverty and improvement in living standards and access to education and health services. Statistics on longevity, infant mortality, literacy and access to primary care show Vietnam's ranking on par with other ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Vietnam reached self-sufficiency in rice production and became the second largest world's rice exporter after Thailand. Nevertheless, wage levels continue to be low. Wages in the Hanoi region in 2007 where about one-third lower than in China. Wages in some higher technology plants in Ho Chi Minh City ranged within A$120-250 per month in 2006 (Karadjis, 2006). In some factories making stuffed animals for the US markets, wages were less that US$2 a day (Giantz & Nguyen, 2007). Poverty linked to low wage is compounded by rising inflation and substantial increase in the price of housing, food and transport, and energy. Land prices in major cities have risen to record highs, accentuating a severe housing crisis.

One-party state. A major shift to a market economy has not led to the liberalization of the political regime. Power continues to be the monopoly of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The party has about 2 million members for a population in excess of 80 million. As in China, membership has recently been opened to capitalists to join ranks with workers, peasants and intellectuals. The party structure is hierarchical, headed by a ruling troika within the Central Committee.

The power of the party relies heavily on the repression of dissent by an extensive security apparatus such as the Stasi-like Cong An, or Public Security Force. It acquires and uses information to control the population and punish those who threaten the state. Dissidents are routinely arrested and detained and there is widespread use of harassment, fear and exclusion as weapons of control. (Any) material critical of the regime, such as demands for political liberalization, is routinely censored. The Internet is also censored and the government has installed systems bought from the United States to screen all outgoing and incoming emails and block access to prohibited sites. Vietnam uses consultants from Singapore to track and control attempts to subvert firewalls, and to monitor the Internet.

The CPVs power rests on the control of the military and paramilitary forces. As in Thailand and Indonesia, the military is to a large extent self-financing through the control of many businesses, including companies that are directly or indirectly related to the armament industry. The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) is involved in many sectors of the economy, including food production, various types of manufacturing, construction, transportation, banking and tourism, and has a number of joint ventures with foreign companies. Between the party and the people are state-controlled civil organizations. The party-state organizes civil society under the umbrella of the Patriotic Front which groups together a number of mass organizations of women, workers, youth, veterans, students, churches, farmers and other social formations. These are given formal representation through organizations such as the Women's Union, Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) and the party-created Buddhist Church of Vietnam (EBV). All organizations are required to operate under the umbrella of a communist organization, such as the Fatherland Front which nominates most of the candidates for local council elections.

Rising contradictions. There are major problems emerging because of contradictions arising from neoliberal economic reforms under a one-party state whose legitimacy rests on the socialist transformation of society. Vietnam is a relatively poor and agrarian country with a per capita yearly income of around 550 Euros in 2006, and a major issue is growing inequality and poverty (Brassard, 2005). Ethnic minorities continue to be among the poorest groups in the country and the extent of inequality is readily seen in levels of infant mortality which vary dramatically from province to province between 85 per 1000 infants to below 20 in urban areas. Central Quang Tri province is one of the country's poorest provinces where the majority of families fall below the poverty line and where many children suffer from malnutrition. The province was one of the most heavily bombed, strafed and shelled in the country during the war. Substantial land area cannot be cultivated because of hidden explosives and chemical poisoning. The country faces other issues such as the polluting  industries from countries like Taiwan and China relocating to Vietnam, attracted by low wages and little, if any, restrictions on labour health and environmental standards.

Vietnam’s urban population was estimated at more than 30% of the country’s 84 million in 2006. Lagging rural development and the pull of cities encourage people to move to cities where many find opportunities lacking and join a growing slum population. Intra-urban inequality is increasing particularly in the two major cities of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh City's canal district slum is growing and housed more than 500,000 people in 2007. Shortage of housing is exacerbated by inflation and increasing rent and land prices. The transition to a market economy has left many poor Vietnamese rural families unable to afford basic health care and they are drawn to the city expecting a better life. Vietnam along with many other countries in the region has a growing problem with a soaring rate of drug addiction among its urban youth.

Corruption increases the level of inequality and undermines the legitimacy of the one-party state Bribing for services is relatively common and so is the siphoning of public wealth by party and other privileged members of societies. Smuggling, fiscal fraud and other rackets proliferate, such as the illegal appropriation of land and natural resources, and construction without a permit. Corruption is highlighted from time to time with major scandals such as the arrest in 2002 of many high officials in Ho Chi Minh City linked to a local crime boss. According to the Vietnamese government, bureaucrats 'creamed off at least 20 per cent of infrastructure spending¹ (Anon 2002). In a letter to the party, war hero general Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that the party had become a shield to protect corrupt officials (Pomonti,  2007).

Struggle for democracy. The nature of power relations in Vietnam lead to demands for equality and the liberalization of the political regime. There is widespread resistance to the one-party state and an ongoing struggle to advance an agenda of civil and political rights. A terrain of contestation is the confrontation with the Catholic and Buddhist leadership over land use and restrictions imposed on their activities. One example is the conflict over the state-created Buddhist Church of Vietnam (EBV) to replace the pre-communist Unified Buddhist Church (EBLJ). Moreover, there is a growing level of unrest among rural and urban workers exemplified by the large number of strikes in recent years for higher wages and better working conditions in foreign-run establishments. These are most visible in urban-based industrial action, which often has the backing of Communist-led unions. Among recent industrial strikes is the case of the Hanoi Canon plant led by the Communist Party's Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL) and its newspaper Lao Dong, and strikes at the Taiwanese-owned Nike plants (bbc, 2008a;  Karadjis,  2006).

On the surface there does not appear to be a mass movement for democracy with clearly identifiable large groups cooperating to bring about a major change in the political regime of the country. The role of the middle class does not seem significant, probably because it is too small and too close to the state to take on a leading progressive role. An authoritarian state makes it difficult if not impossible for various resistance groups to forge an alliance, and activists in the cities are small in numbers. This could change in the future in view of Vietnam's rising levels of urbanization. Western and diaspora interests are nevertheless busy funding opposition groups and undermining the legitimacy of the communist state. A recent example is the US-funded Movement for National Unity and Building Democracy's attempts to hold an 'International Conference for Development in Vietnam' in Ho Chi Minh City in the early 1990s. Western governments are also involved in covert operations, aiding some urban groups and arming ethnic minorities in the country's highlands.

Democratization is more likely as a result of change within Vietnam's authoritarian governance. The rapid expansion of capitalism in the country is creating divergence, competition and faction within the party-state structure, and paradoxically expands and opens the political space for discussion and negotiation. Invariably the party has to include new factions in its political and ideological arenas, and acknowledge the existence of faction politics. In other words the adoption of market capitalism expands the legitimacy of what can be discussed and debated, what opinions expressed and what channels can be used and institutionalized. This is clearly exemplified in a small but significant way in the expansion of the party membership to include a new class of capitalist professionals and entrepreneurs.

Gainsborough and others suggest that democratization is unlikely to come from the leadership of a particular class or changing class relations, or from the militant role of the middle class (Bell, et al., 1995, Gainsborough, 2002). Gainsborough writes that 'in Vietnam the main arena of struggle is within the state' (Gainborough, 2002:706).

As in Singapore the state creates new organizations which it controls to meet demands of a rapidly expanding market economy and consumer society. However, what allows the party to stay in power is the existence and expansion of the market economy. It allows people to vent their frustration and struggle in the market place, competing for employment, education and the accumulation of wealth. This is possible with the expansion of employment and educational opportunities and the consumer market. Competition is also waged in the rapidly expanding activity of the stock and land market where there exists the possibility of substantial gain and wealth accumulation. The property game of buying, developing and selling property is of particular significance in Vietnam, particularly in the south. In a market economy the individual struggles to survive, and getting ahead is a form of social and political control, and where the 'civil' war is fought in the market while leaving the political control of the country to the party-state. Market capitalism can be viewed as a more efficient and sophisticated form of social control than the traditional East German 'stasi-type' state repression. This situation is likely to continue while the economy expands and ambitious entrepreneurs have opportunities to expand their energy and ambitions, and people's hope for a better life shows some progress and meet expectations.

Prospects. There are a number of contradictions in the country's power relations which underlie conflict and pressure for resolution. Growing inequality weakens the legitimacy of the Communist Party one-party state and raises demands to further liberalize the political economy. The danger is that the party will become increasingly nationalistic to maintain its hold on power and revive the history of Vietnam's struggle for liberation from US occupation and of the crimes committed by the United States between 1961 and 1971. Most Vietnamese have condemned the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and political forces will continue to manipulate nationalism and increasingly make use of memories to revive its sense of uniqueness, shared loss and suffering and grievance against others.

Another contradiction emerges with the integration of Vietnam's economy in a neoliberal global economy. Joining the WTO locks Vietnam into a timetable to further liberalize the economy. What are the implications of 'locking into' the global state for Vietnam's one party state and plans for a socialist society? Part of the answer depends on whether the neoliberal economy delivers on promises for economic growth, and the modernization and well-being of Vietnam's society. The future of a capitalist global economy is not assured and another 1997 Asian financial crisis is a clear possibility. The flaws of the US economy and global financial system were again clearly demonstrated in the 2008 liquidity crisis. There are also serious concerns about the security situation and the tensions developing between the West and China. Moreover, environmental degradation and climate change has implications for Vietnam's politics. Sea-level rises are likely to have a major impact on the country's economy, exposing major industrial, urban and agricultural areas to permanent flooding and salt-water damage. This would lead to major population movement inland and probably overseas.

BURMA

The British established their control over Myanmar during the eighteenth century, finalizing their military campaign with the fall of Mandalay in 1886. Buddhism played an important role as a rallying point for Myanmar’s nationalism and provided the network to spread nationalist ideas and organize resistance against British rule. During WWII, nationalist members of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) linked up with the Invading Japanese army to build up their political, military organization and power. The end of the Japanese occupation led to negotiations for independence between various political and ethnic factions and the British. These were interrupted by the assassination of the nationalist leader general Aung San in July 1946. independence was proclaimed in 1948 by the country's new prime minister, U Nu who led the country from 1948 to 1958 and again from 1960 to 1962 when he was deposed in a military coup led by army chief, general Ne Win (Butwell, 1963).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Myanmar was engaged in many struggles to define its territorial sovereignty, identity and politics. Myanmar's 50 million people are now among the poorest in the world; average salary is about US$1 a day, while under-five mortality rate is among the highest in the world (un, 2006a). Overseas development assistance per capita was US$2.4 in 2006 compared with $22 in Vietnam, $35 in Cambodia, and $47 in Lao People's Democratic Republic' (Doyle, 2007). Most people gain their livelihood from agriculture and, while Myanmar is a major producer and world exporter of rice, people suffer from shortages of basic commodities and rising inflation.

Military dictatorship. The country has been ruled by a military dictatorship since 1962 when Army chief Ne Win brought the military to the centre stage of society. An economic crisis in 1988 precipitated his downfall and power shifted to a group of generals and their newly formed State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) which opened up the country to foreign investment, and subsequently became known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The military regime has functioned along with a political wing; under Ne Win it was the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), then came the National Unity Party (NUP) and the latest party appellation is the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) which was said to have some 11 million members in the late 1990s (Christie & Roy, 2001:86).

In recent years, the military has paid close attention to Indonesia's situation and copied Suharto's mode! of governance. Suharto visited in 1997 with his eldest daughter, who has investment in the country. What appealed to them was the dwifungsi, or dual-function, ideology of the Suharto regime which institutionalized the role of the military in Indonesian politics and development, and how the ruling elite's children had become entrepreneurs and were running conglomerates. Myanmar leaders have also been studying Singapore as a potential model to run their country. Some aspects of the one-party state are attractive to the regime. However, Singapore is a small urban city state without the problems and challenges of a large peasantry. Suharto's downfall was a lesson for Myanmar's generals about the political consequences of an economic crisis triggered by globalization. This and rising political instability in the country may have been behind the regime depopulating sections of Yangon.

Paranoia pervades the politics of the military regime. The construction of a culture of nationalism and pride based on Burma’s civilization's golden past, embodied in places like Pagan and Mandalay, are necessarily linked to xenophobia and fear of foreign intrusion and constant concern about an enemy set on destroying its culture and dividing the country. One of the more significant recent developments has been the decision of the military to move its capital to a newly built city which they named Naypyidaw - translated as Royal City or Seat of Kings. The new capital is on the train line to Mandalay near the town of Pyinmana, 400 kms north of Rangoon. Naypyidaw is closed to foreigners. Shifting the capital appears to be motivated by a desire to return to a royal tradition, the golden past of Burma's kingdom, and find security away from the coast (Boucaud & Boucaud, 2006b). Another issue appears to be the fear of a US-sponsored invasion to put Aung San Suu Kyi in power.

Military power depends on the control of the economy and more importantly on deals to sell the country's resources to foreign companies. This was achieved after a new junta dismantled the socialist system imposed by Ne Win and enticed foreign investment from the European Union, United States, Singapore and elsewhere in the late 1980s, allowing wholly owned foreign ventures and generous tax breaks and the free repatriation of profits. Private banks were allowed to operate in 1992 for the first time since 1962, along with a start to privatize public companies. This change of economic policy towards a neoliberal-type market economy enabled friendly ties with Western capital and foreign aid. The financing of the regime by foreign investors, however, would not be possible without the  participation of global insurers which directly or indirectly insure businesses 'that provide a cash lifeline for the generals' (Kazmin, 2008). During the early phase of the new policy, foreign investment focused on energy resources and the discovery and deposit by companies such as Amoco, Unocal, Shell and Total. Russia is the latest entry in the energy market with deals for oil and gas exploration and development and a 2007 contract to build a 10-megawatt nuclear power facility.   

More recent projects focus on the construction of a number of dams on the Salween River to generate power

for export to Thailand and China. A number of contracts have been signed with Thai and Chinese companies to build hydropower dams on what is Southeast Asia's last free flowing river and which will lead to flooding oflarge areas and the displacement of a number of villages (MacKinnon, 2007). Myanmar is a major supplier oftimber to Thailand and other countries. The Thai military has been closely connected with logging licenses andthe transport and processing of logs in Thailand. Other natural resources exported include coal, gold and gems. The construction of the country's infrastructure to support foreign investment has been undertaken bythe regime's policy of forced labor. Large numbers of people have been moved from communities in cities and minority regions into controlled zones and labour camps (McDougall, 2007; Pilger, 1996). The regime has been using slave labour to construct a significant number of projects including the construction of the 176-kilometres rail line between Ye to the southern town of Tavoy (Christie & Roy, 2001:93).                                                                                                                            
Intelligence Agency (CIA) who enrolled and paid Chinese and other minorities to fight on their side. Historian
Alfred McCoy, in his b0ok The Politics of Heroin, maintains that the production of drugs in the Golden Triangle, the region where Burma, Laos and Thailand converge, was the main source of opium and heroin during the
Vietnam warrior growing markets in South Vietnam as well as the United States (McCoy, 1972). Trade in illicit
drugs continues and has been a traditional source of income for the military. Myanmar continues to be a
source of heroin and opium, with most of the opium poppies grown along border areas. However, its place in
the world market has been taken by Afghanistan since 1993. Afghanistan has become the largest producer of opium, with an estimated 8200 metric tons in 2007 which supplied some 90% of the world market (UN, 2007). A more recent and major addition to the drug economy in Myanmar is the production of amphetamines
for export. The military essentially runs a protection racket, tying the regime with narco-traffickers operating in
for export. The military essentially runs a protection racket, tying the regime with narco-traffickers operating in
the Golden Triangle.                                                                                                         

During the cold war the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Army in Burma expanded opium production in the Shan region and the manufacture of heroin for exports. Their operation was supported by the Central

Myanmar's inclusion in a West-led globalism has funded the growth of military power and purchase of modern weaponry. Numbers in the military and paramilitary forces have grown substantially in recent years to more than 400,000, Southeast Asia's second largest army after Vietnam. Supply of modern equipment has come from a number of countries, including China, North Korea, Russia, India and Singapore. Growth of military power has enabled the regime to expand its territorial control, fight all insurgencies and establish its jurisdiction in nearly every small town and village. Singapore, through its arms manufacturers Chartered  Industries, has contributed to the country's arms industry. Singapore also has links with the intelligence services, building up its surveillance system and cyber-warfare centre in the Defence Ministry to intercept all types of communication, including e-mail, leading to the arrest and jailing of many dissidents.

Struggle for democracy. Myanmar is involved in two major types of struggle. The first could be considered a class struggle which is waged mainly by Burma’s resistance to state repression and driven by demands for political and civil rights. The main challenger is the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner and daughter of one of Myanmar's independence heroes, General Aung San. The NLD was the prime mover in a 1988 mass protest, triggered by the collapse of the economy, which ended when the army killed thousands of protesters in the streets of Rangoon and elsewhere in the country (Maung, 1993). Under internal and external pressure, the military regime agreed to hold national elections in May 1990 which the NLD won, with 67 per cent of the vote and 82 per cent of the seats (Pilger 1996). Subsequently, the military annulled the results and resumed their campaign repression and arrest, detention, torture and extrajudicial killings.

The NLD's strength is based on mass dissatisfaction with the economic situation of Myanmar, blamed on the corruption and incompetence of the military, which was again tragically demonstrated in the aftermath of the May 2008 Cyclone Nargis which devastated the Irrawaddy Delta region, the country's rice bowl. People ar§ also rebelling against a regime that rules by fear. Freedom from fear has been a powerful theme in Aung San Suu Kyi's campaign for liberation. She once wrote that within a system which denies the existence of basic human rights, fear tends to be the order of the day. Fear of imprisonment, torture or death; fear of losing friends, family or property; and fear of isolation or failure (Suu Kyi, 1991). Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest more or less continuously since 1989.

The country's monks constitute a major source of resistance in the struggle for democracy. In September 2007 they led a major anti-government demonstration in Yangoon and other cities which was brutally repressed by the government. The political role of the 400,000 or more monks and nuns in Myanmar continues to be a source of controversy. Some elements support the use of violence and claim that the use of force to overthrow an 'evil government' is a rightful deed in Buddha's teachings. For another major faction, politics is 'none of our business, it's not the monks business to be involved in these things. Monks should stay out of polities' (abc, 2008). Clearly the Buddhist clergy is becoming increasingly involved in the resistance movement and engaged in a rebellion against the government. One of the more active groups is the All Burma Young Monks Union which is openly working with students and ethnic rebel groups to overthrow the government.

Another major struggle is the country's ethnic minority demands for self-determination and, in some instances, outright independence. The issue is a serious challenge to the country's Burman majority and mostly Buddhist population. The non-Burman, more than 135 ethnic groups, occupy more than 50 per cent of the country's territory, mostly highlands and rich in natural resources. A number of ethnic groups, along the eastern border with China and Thailand are fighting the regime. The three armed resistance groups are the Restoration Council of the Shan State and its military wing, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), the Karen and Karen National Union (KNU) and their military wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Karenni members of the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP), the most powerful group fighting at this time. Another group, the mostly Christian Kachin people and the Kachin Liberation Army who occupy a large northern region, instigated a ceasefire in 1994, but elements are still fighting the government.

On the Chinese border are the Wa people who have been a major ally with the regime against the Shan State Army (SSA) They gained autonomy over an important border region where the official currency is the Chinese Yuan and the only languages spoken and taught are Wa and Chinese (Boucaud & Boucaud, 2006a). The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is into trafficking opiates and amphetamines with the profit used to build an infrastructure and invest in legitimate business activities. The business is run by Chinese descendants of a large Kuomintang army who invaded Myanmar in 1950 and developed the drug economy of the Golden Triangle (Lintner, 1992; McCoy, 1972). Drug lords have set up casinos to attract large numbers of Chinese to cross the border. They also control Myanmar's largest conglomerates, Asian World, headed by Lo Hsing Han, and Hong Pang Co controlled by Wei Shao Kang (Boucaud & Boucaud, 2003).

The military regime also faces strong resistance on the western side of the country, along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. There are confrontations along the border region with Bangladesh and India by Muslim ethnic minorities in the Arakan State, who face deportation and the Burmanization of their culture. Zachary Abuza claims that there are 'three Muslim-based guerrilla movements in Myanmar: the Ommat Liberation Front, the Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Front, and the Muslim Liberation Organization of Myanmar' (Abuza, 2003.173). Large numbers of Muslims have fled and taken refuge in Bangladesh. Another important minority are the mostly Christian Chin people who have been persecuted by the Myanmar military regime. Many families nave fled to India and Bangladesh over the years. Further south in the Tenasserim Division, which borders the Andaman Sea and Thailand, the Mons and Karens are resisting Burman repression and military intervention.

Government policy is to gain control over all ethnic minorities and integrate their population within the mainstream Burman-Buddhist majority. Key issues are the demarcation of the country's boundaries and the control of natural resources which are critical to Myanmar's economic development. The main strategy has been military action to overwhelm resistance and negotiate peace terms. In some instances this has succeeded in splitting groups or leading one ethnic minority to fight another. Villages have been destroyed and populations moved to special zones and work camps to build roads, bridges, military camps, irrigation works and oil and gas pipelines The military has been accused of genocide in its war against minority populations and of creating large refugee camps in border regions.

Geopolitics. Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, sponsored by both Indonesia and Singapore. Membership to Southeast Asia's regional body has been useful in developing business and military connections and gaining greater access to capital and trade with the rest of the world. It has had little impact, however, on the regime's abuse of human rights, not surprisingly given the appalling record of ASEAN's member states. Being part of ASEAN has not eased tense relations with Thailand. This love-hate relationship is an integral feature of the two countries' historical enmity and a legacy of their cold war confrontation when Thailand was arming minority groups. More recently, there was a military clash over claims of 'flooding' Thailand with amphetamine tablets to feed a growing addiction among young people. Thailand is involved in the drug trade and illegal logging of Myanmar's forests. Moreover, Thailand needs Myanmar because of an increasing dependence on its neighbor for energy and natural resources such as large quantities of water to replenish reservoirs and irrigate the northeast of the country (Boucaud & Boucaud, 2000).

Myanmar's close relation with China poses some interesting questions regarding the future of democratization. In recent years, people and trade have been moving south, using the Irrawaddy, Salween and Mekong river systems. There has been a substantial flow of Chinese migrants and traders into Myanmar, and China has been building an extensive road infrastructure linking its territory with Myanmar's border region and national road system. David Steinberg suggests that Mandalay is 20 per cent Yunnanese Chinese, Lashio - the most important city of northern Burma - about 50 per cent Chinese' (Steinberg, 2004). Work on the Irrawaddy to enable ships to navigate to Yangon, and other infrastructure development, is meant to link the industrial base and economic potential of Yunnan province with Myanmar's coast and parts of Asia. China is constructing pipelines from the coast to Yunnan province and major contracts have been signed with Petro China for the exploration and development of the country's energy resources, including offshore gas deposits.

China is a major supplier of arms to the military regime. There are major military ties with China's use of a number of naval intelligence bases in the Andaman Sea, including Ramree on the Bay of Bengal, the Coco Island and Victoria Point in the Andaman Sea (Lintner, 1994b). China is modernizing a number of naval bases to support submarine operations in the region and access to the Straits of Malacca. An India based analyst writes that 'the Indian navy fears that this could support Chinese submarine operations in the region and enhance its military profile in the Indian Ocean region' (Rahman, 2007). Port facilities would enable China to import oil into southwest China and bypass the Straits of Malacca. Yet India has been selling a range of military hardware to Myanmar. The arms aid package is said to include 'counterinsurgency helicopters, avionics upgrade of Burma's Russian- and Chinese-made fighter planes and naval surveillance aircraft' (hrw, 2006a). India is also financing infrastructure projects such as the Asian Highway and the gas links with the Arakan state, in which India is a major investor. India's interest is driven by its expanding economy and geopolitical considerations. China's close political and economic ties with Myanmar are of concern to India, as well as the secessionist movements in India's eastern states. Some 12 secessionist groups in India have military outposts on the Myanmar side of the border, including the United Liberation Front of Assam.

The future of Myanmar's military regime is closely linked to its relations with ASEAN and the global situation. China, India and Russia are all involved in Myanmar's politics as major suppliers of weaponry and energy investors. Myanmar is caught in the geopolitics of global hegemony and the making of an anti-US alliance. As such, Myanmar is of considerable interest to the West as the dynamics of global hegemony are being played out in Asia and particularly in Southeast Asia. This means that considerable pressure is being put on the military regime's domestic and foreign policy. The government has responded to external pressure by announcing a referendum in May 2008 to approve a new constitution for the country and general elections for 2010. The military would control the new parliament with an allocation of 25 per cent of the seats and veto power over parliamentary decisions. The proposed constitution would guarantee people's right to form political organizations, including unions. There would be freedom of the press, and minority cultures and languages would be protected. Aung San Suu Kyi, however, would be barred from office because she married a foreigner.

GUIDE QUESTIONS

1.     Describe briefly how and why Siam was not colonized and was able to maintain its independence.

2.     Describe briefly the political reforms that resulted from the 1997 Thai constitution.

3.     Describe briefly how Thaksin rose to power.

4.     How did Thaksin earn the support of the masses?

5.     How did Thaksin’s wealth grow during his premiership?

6.     Why was the Shin Corporation deal a big issue against Thaksin?

7.     Describe briefly how Thaksin attacked governance and transparency during his premiership.

8.     How do you describe Thaksin’s human rights record when he was the prime minister?

9.     How did Thaksin earn the displeasure of the Thai military?

10.   What is the political purpose and message of the 2006 coup in Thailand?

11.   Cite and describe briefly the different obstacles to Thailand’s democratization.

12.   Describe briefly how the military maintained a firm position in Thai politics.

13.   Why is the King of Thailand considered to be anti-democracy?

14.   Cite and describe briefly the factors that were effectively used to maintain the Thai people’s trust in the King.

15.   Why did the author claim that there appears to be a crisis in the future succession of the King?

16.   Describe the consequences of the war in Cambodia:

a.     Politics

b.     Economy

c.     Environment

d.     Morale of the people

17.   Identify and explain the factors that led to the emergence of the Khmer Rouge.

18.   Identify the failures of the UNTAC in Cambodia.

19.   Why was proportional representation not suited to the local culture?

20.   Explain why democracy does not have a strong foundation of democracy.

21.   Describe how the one party system evolved in Cambodia.

22.   Describe the leadership style of Hun Sen.

23.   Discuss briefly how Cambodia became a repressive state.

24.   Describe the system of patronage in Cambodia.

25.   Explain why Cambodian authoritarianism is said to be defined by corruption.

26.   Describe the political factor of environmental degradation in Cambodia.

27.   Explain how repression can go together with corruption.

28.   Discuss briefly the close links between corruption, repression, and cash flows.

29.   Describe the process of land dispossession in Cambodia.

30.   Describe briefly the prospects of Cambodia’s democratization.

31.   Why is Laos considered one of the most bombed countries?

32.   Describe US’s intervention in Laos.

33.   Describe briefly the causes of corruption in Laos.

34.   Describe briefly the changes in the Pathet Lao’s ideology.

35.   Cite and describe briefly the interests of foreign countries that invested in Laos.

36.   Describe the prospects of democratization in Laos.

37.   Explain the causes of trade deficit in Laos.

38.   Describe the economic reforms in Laos.

39.   Describe briefly how the Lao leaders are using Buddhism for a political purpose.

40.   Describe the economic consequences of foreign investments in Laos.

41.   Describe briefly the relationship between Laos and the World Bank.

42.   Describe briefly the consequences of US’s war in Vietnam.

43.   Describe the consequences of Vietnam’s integration in the global economy.

44.   Give and explain briefly the rising contradictions in Vietnam.

45.   What are the factors undermining the legitimacy of the Communist rule in Vietnam?

46.   How does the Vietnamese government use technology to promote repression.

47.   Describe briefly the ill consequences of market economy in Vietnam.

48.   Describe any similarity/ies between Singapore and Vietnam.

49.   Describe how climate change can affect the economic development of Cambodia and Vietnam.

50.   Describe the challenges to the struggle for democracy in Vietnam.

51.   Describe the similarity between Indonesia and Burma in terms of military presence in politics.

52.   Give the reason for changing the capital city of Burma.

53.   Describe the changes in the economic policies of Burma.

54.   Identify the interests in Burma of the foreign states that invested in it.

55.   Describe briefly the drug economy of Burma.

56.   Describe the National League for Democracy’s source of political strength.

57.   Describe the major struggles in Burma: monks, ethnic groups.

58.   Who is Aung San Su Kyi to the military junta?

59.   Describe the role of China in Burma’s economy.

60.   How do you describe the relationship of Burma and Thailand?

61.   How do you describe the relationship between Burma and China?

62.   Describe how Thailand, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia are commonly using Buddhism for political ends.

63.   Give a geopolitical explanation for Communist takeover of Indochina but not for Thailand.

64.   Cite and explain briefly the common obstacles to the democratization of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand.

65.   Cite and explain briefly the factors that institutionalized the involvement of the military in the politics of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand.